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Abstract
Online social networks are used to diffuse opinions and ideas among users,
enabling a faster communication and a wider audience. The way in which
opinions are conditioned by social interactions is usually called social influence.
Social influence is extensively used during political campaigns to advertise and
support candidates.
Herein we consider the problem of exploiting social influence in a network of
voters in order to change their opinion about a target candidate with the aim of
increasing his chance to win/lose the election in a wide range of voting systems.
We introduce the Linear Threshold Ranking, a natural and powerful extension
of the well-established Linear Threshold Model, which describes the change of
opinions taking into account the amount of exercised influence. We are able to
maximize the score of a target candidate up to a factor of 1− 1/e by showing
submodularity. We exploit such property to provide a 13 (1− 1/e)-approximation
algorithm for the constructive election control problem. Similarly, we get a
1
2 (1− 1/e)-approximation ratio in the destructive scenario. The algorithm can
be used in arbitrary scoring rule voting systems, including plurality rule and
borda count. Finally, we perform an experimental study on real-world networks,
measuring Probability of Victory (PoV) and Margin of Victory (MoV) of
the target candidate, to validate the model and to test the capability of the
algorithm.
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1 Introduction
As humans, we usually have a specific personal opinion on certain topics, such as
lifestyle or consumer products. These opinions, normally formed on personal life
experience and information, can be conditioned by the interaction with our friends
leading to a change in our original opinion on a particular topic if a large part of our
friends holds a different opinion.
In the last decades, this phenomenon of opinion diffusion has been intensely
investigated from many different perspectives, from sociology to economics. In recent
years, there has been a growing interest on the relationship between social networks
and political campaigning. Political campaigns nowadays use online social networks
to lead elections in their favor; for example, they can target specific voters with fake
news [AG17]. A real-life example of political intervention in this context occurred in
the US Congressional elections in 2010, where a set of users were encouraged to vote
with a message on Facebook. These messages directly influenced the real-world voting
behavior of millions of people [BFJ+12]. Another example is that of French elections
in 2017, where automated accounts in social networks spread a considerable portion
of political content, mostly fake news, trying to influence their outcome [Fer17].
There exist an extensive literature on manipulating elections without considering
the underlying social network structure of the voters, e.g., swap bribery [EFS09],
shift bribery [BFNT16]; we point the reader to a recent survey [FRM16].
The study of opinion diffusion modeled as a majority dynamics has attracted
much attention in recent literature [ACF+15, BEEG16, BGP17]. In these models
each agent has an initial preference list and at each time step a subset of agents
updates their opinions, i.e., their preference lists, according to some majority-based
rule that depends on the opinions of their neighbors in the network.
Nevertheless, there are only few studies on the opinion diffusion on social networks.
The Independent Cascade Model [KKT03] has been considered as diffusion process
to guarantee that a target candidate wins/loses [BTT92, HHR07]. The constructive
(destructive) election control problem consists in targeting a specific candidate to
change voters’ opinions about him with the aim of maximizing (minimizing) his
margin and probability of victory [WV18b]. A variant of the Linear Threshold
Model [KKT03] with weights on the vertices has been considered on a graph in which
each node is a cluster of voters with a specific list of candidates and there is an
edge between two nodes if they differ by the ordering of a single pair of adjacent
candidates [FGKT18]. Moreover, it has been studied how to manipulate the network
in order to have control on the majority opinion, e.g., bribing or adding/deleting edges,
on a simple Linear Threshold Model where each node holds a binary opinion, each
edge has the same fixed weight, and all vertices have a threshold fixed to 1/2 [BE17].
In this work we focus on a variant of the election control through social influence
problem defined in [WV18b]: Given a social network of people willing to vote, we
want to select a fixed-size subset of voters such that their influence on the others will
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change the election outcome, maximizing the chances of a target candidate to win
or lose, in the specific scenario in which only the opinions about a target candidate
can be changed. Differently from previous work [WV18b] we consider more general
voting systems and a different diffusion model, that takes into account the degree of
influence that voters exercise on the others and is able to describe the scenario in
which a high influence on someone can radically change its opinion. In this setting
we prove the nontrivial fact that any scoring function is monotone and submodular
with respect to the initial set of active nodes. Moreover we exploit this fact to prove
a constant factor approximation of the election control problem in our model.
1.1 Original Contribution
• We introduce the Linear Threshold Ranking, a natural and powerful extension
of the Linear Threshold Model for the election scenario that takes into account
the degree of influence of the voters on each other.
• We prove that, in such model, we can achieve a (1− 1/e)-approximation to the
problem of maximizing the score of a target candidate by proving submodularity
in the general case of the scoring rule for arbitrary scoring function (including
popular voting systems, e.g., plurality rule or borda count), with any number of
candidates.
• We exploit the (1− 1/e)-approximation algorithm that maximizes the score to
achieve an extra approximation factor of 13 to the problem of maximizing the
Margin of Victory of a target candidate in arbitrary scoring rule voting systems
with any number of candidates.
• We give a simple reduction that maps destructive control problems to construc-
tive control ones and allows us to achieve a 12(1− 1/e)-approximation to the
destructive control problem.
• We perform simulations of our model on four heterogeneous real-world networks
and test the capability of our algorithm.
2 Background
In this section we present some notions and concepts about voting systems and
influence maximization on social networks that will be used in the design and analysis
of the algorithm. Moreover we formally introduce the problem and the notation used
to analyze it.
2.1 Voting Systems
Voting systems are sets of rules that regulate all aspects of elections and that determine
their outcome. In particular a voting system decides candidates and voters eligibility,
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other than fixing the rules for determining the winner of the elections. Social choice
theory formally defines and analyzes voting systems, studying how the combination of
individual opinions or preferences reaches a collective decision; computational social
choice, instead, studies the computational complexity of outcomes of voting rules and
can serve as a barrier against strategic manipulation in elections [CELM07, FP10,
BCE+16, End17].
We focus on two single-winner voting systems:
• Plurality rule: Each voter can only express a single preference among the
candidates and that with the plurality of the votes wins, i.e., it is sufficient to
have the highest number of votes and there is no need of an absolute majority
(50%+1 of votes).
• Scoring rule: Each voter expresses his preference as a ranking ; each candidate
is then assigned a score, computed as a function of the positions he was ranked
among the voters.
The former is arguably the simplest scenario and is one of the most commonly used for
national legislatures and presidential elections. The latter is a very general definition,
but can include several popular election methods by choosing an adequate scoring
function:
• if the scoring function assigns 1 point to the first candidate and 0 to all the
others this is equivalent to the plurality rule;
• if the scoring function assigns 1 point to the first t candidates and 0 to the
others then it is equivalent to the t-approval, where each voter approves t
candidates;
• if the scoring function assigns 1 point to the first m− t candidates and 0 to the
remaining t, where m is the total number of candidates, then it is equivalent to
the t-veto or anti-plurality rule;
• if the scoring function assigns m− l points to the candidate in position l then it
is equivalent to the borda count, in which each voter ranks the candidates and
each candidate gets a score equal to the number of candidates ranked lower in
each list.
2.2 Influence Maximization
The influence maximization problem studies a social network represented as a graph
and has the goal of finding the B-sized set of influential nodes that can maximize
the spread of information [KKT15]. In general, all existing diffusion models can be
categorized into three classes: cascade models, threshold models, and epidemic models.
The most popular for studying social influence problems are the Independent Cascade
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Model (ICM) and the Linear Threshold Model (LTM). These models are graph-based,
namely they assume an underlying directed graph where nodes represent agents and
edges represent connections between them. Each node can be either active, that is it
spreads the information, or inactive. With some probability, active nodes diffuse the
information to their neighbors. The ICM model requires a diffusion probability to be
associated with each edge, whereas LTM requires an influence degree to be defined
on each edge and an influence threshold on each node. For both models, the diffusion
process proceeds iteratively in a synchronous way along a discrete time-axis, starting
from an initial set of nodes, usually called seeds.
In this work we focus on LTM [KKT03]. Given a graph G = (V,E), in LTM
each node v ∈ V has a threshold tv ∈ [0, 1] sampled uniformly at random and
independently from the other nodes and each edge (u, v) ∈ E has a weight buv ∈ [0, 1]
with the constraint that, for each v ∈ V , the sum of the weights of the incoming
edges of v is less or equal to 1, i.e.,
∑
(u,v)∈E buv ≤ 1. Let A0 ⊆ V be the set of
active nodes at the beginning of the process. More in general, let At ⊆ V be the
set of nodes active at time t. In LTM an inactive node v becomes active if the
sum of the weights of the edges coming from nodes that are active at the previous
round is greater than or equal to its threshold tv, i.e., v ∈ At if and only if v ∈ At−1
or
∑
u∈At−1:(u,v)∈E buv ≥ tv. When a node is active, it influences its neighbors and
increases the chance of making them change their preference list. The process has
quiesced at the first time t˜ such that the set of active nodes would not change in the
next round, i.e., time t˜ is such that At˜ = At˜+1. We define the eventual set of active
nodes as A := At˜.
The distribution of the set of active nodes in the graph starting with A0 under
the LTM process is equivalent to the distribution reachable from the same set A0 in
the set of random graphs called live-edge graphs (Theorem 1). A live-edge graph is
built as follows: Given an influence graph G = (V,E), for every node v ∈ V select at
most one of its incoming edges with probability proportional to the weight of that
edge, i.e., edge (u, v) is selected with probability buv, and no edge is selected with
probability 1−∑u∈Nv buv. Let us denote by G the set of all possible live-edge graphs
that can be generated from G.
Theorem 1 (Kempe, Kleinberg, and Tardos [KKT15]). Given a graph G = (V,E)
and an initial set of nodes A0 ⊆ V , the distribution of the sets of active nodes in G
after LTM has quiesced starting from A0 is equal to the distribution of the sets of
nodes that are reachable from A0 in the set of live-edge graphs G.
Moreover, under the live-edge model, the problem of selecting the initial set
of nodes in order to maximize the diffusion is submodular [KKT15]. Therefore,
exploiting a classical result [NWF78], the influence maximization problem can be
approximated to a constant factor of 1 − 1/e using a simple greedy hill-climbing
approach that starts with an empty solution and, for B iterations, selects a single
node that gives the maximal marginal gain on the objective function with respect
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the solution computed so far. This algorithm guarantees the best approximation,
but is still very computational expensive: Evaluating the expected number of active
nodes is #P -hard [CYZ10]. There exists a simulation-based approach in which a
Monte-Carlo simulation is performed to evaluate the influence spread of a given seed
set A [KKT15]. The standard Chernoff-Hoeffding bounds imply 1±  approximation
to the expected number of active nodes by simulating a polynomial number of times
the diffusion process.
3 Linear Threshold Ranking and Election Control
We consider the scenario in which a set of candidates are running for the elections
and a social network of voters will decide the winner. In particular we focus on the
simple plurality rule and on the more general case of the scoring rule.
Some attacker could be interested in changing the outcome of the elections by
targeting a subset of voters with advertisement or (possibly fake) news about one
specific candidate. Such voters, with some probability, can influence their friends
by sharing the news. Suppose the attacker has a budget that can use to target
some voters and that they will start a diffusion process that changes opinions in
the network. Is it possible for the attacker to select a set of voters in order to have
constructive/destructive control over a target candidate, i.e., to change the voters’
opinions on this candidate in order to maximizes his chances to win/lose the elections?
More formally, let G = (V,E) be a directed graph representing the underlying
social network of people willing to vote. For each node v ∈ V we call Nv the sets of
incoming neighbors of v. Let C = {c1, . . . , cm} be a set of m candidates nominated
for the elections; we refer to our target candidate, i.e., the one that we want to make
win/lose the elections, as c?. Each v ∈ V has a permutation piv of C, i.e., its list of
preferences for the elections; we denote the position of candidate ci in the preference
list of node v as piv(ci).
We consider the LTM process starting from an initial set of active nodes A0 ⊆ V .
Recall that, according to LTM, each node v ∈ V has a threshold tv, each edge
(u, v) ∈ E has a weight buv, and that A ⊆ V is the set of active nodes at the end of
the process.
Let B ∈ N be an initial budget that can be used to select the nodes in A0, i.e.,
the set of active nodes from which the LTM process starts. In particular, the budget
constrains the size of A0, namely |A0| ≤ B.
After the LTM process has quiesced, the position of c? in the preference list of
each node changes according to a function of its incoming active neighbors. The
threshold tv of each node v ∈ V models its strength in retaining its original opinion
about candidate c?: The higher is the threshold tv the lower is the probability that
v is influenced by its neighbors. Moreover the weight on an edge buv measures the
influence that node u has on node v. Taking into account the role of such parameters,
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we define the number of positions that c? goes up in piv as
pi↑v(c?) := min
piv(c?)− 1,
α(piv(c?))
tv
∑
u∈A, (u,v)∈E
buv
 ,
where α : {1, . . . ,m} → [0, 1] is a function that depends on the position of c? in piv
and models the rate at which c? shifts up. Note that α can be set arbitrarily to model
different scenarios, e.g., shifting up of one position from the bottom of the list could
be easier than going from the second position to the first with a suitable choice of α.
As for pi↑v(c?), it can be any integer value in {0, . . . , piv(c?)− 1}: The floor function
guarantees a positive integer value; the minimum between such value and piv(c?)− 1
guarantees that final position of c? is at least 1, since the floor function could output
too high values when the threshold is small w.r.t. the neighbors’ influence. We call
this process the Linear Threshold Ranking (LTR).
After the modification of the lists at the end of LTR, the candidates might
have a new position in the preference list of each node v ∈ V ; we denote such
new preference list as p˜i. In particular, the new position of candidate c? will be
p˜iv(c?) := piv(c?) − pi↑v(c?); the candidates that are overtaken by c? will shift one
position down.
In the problem of election control we want to maximize the chances of the
target candidate to win the elections under LTR. To achieve that, we maximize its
expected Margin of Victory (MoV) w.r.t. the most voted opponent, akin to that
defined in [WV18b].1 Let us consider the general case of the scoring rule, where a
nonincreasing scoring function f : {1, . . . ,m} → N assigns a score to each position.
Let c and c˜ respectively be the candidates, different from c?, with the highest score
before and after LTR. Let
µ(∅) :=
∑
v∈V
f(piv(c))− f(piv(c?)) (1)
µ(A0) :=
∑
v∈V
f(p˜iv(c˜))− f(p˜iv(c?)) (2)
be the margin (i.e., difference in score) between the most voted opponent and c?
before and after LTR (Equations (1) and (2)). Thus, the election control problem is
formalized as that of finding a set of nodes A0 such that
maxA0 E [MoV(A0)] := E [µ(∅)− µ(A0)]
s.t. |A0| ≤ B,
namely to find an initial set of seed nodes of at most size B that maximizes the
expected MoV, i.e., change in margin.2
1We actually study the change in the margin – not just the margin – to have well defined
approximation ratios also when the margin is negative.
2Note that MoV is always positive since the scoring function f is nonincreasing.
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Algorithm 1 Greedy
Require: Social graph G = (V,E); Budget B; Score function F
1: A0 = ∅
2: while |A0| ≤ B do
3: v = arg maxw∈V \A0 F (A0 ∪ {w})− F (A0)
4: A0 = A0 ∪ {v}
5: return A0
To solve the problem we focus on the score of the target candidate. Let us define
F (∅) :=
∑
v∈V
f(piv(c?)) (3)
F (A0) := E
[∑
v∈V
f(p˜iv(c?))
]
(4)
as the total expected score obtained by candidate c? before and after LTR (Equa-
tions (3) and (4)). In Sections 4 and 5 we prove that the score of the target candidate
is a monotone submodular function w.r.t. the initial set of seed nodes A0 in both the
plurality and the scoring rule; this allows us to get a (1− 1/e)-approximation of the
maximum score through the use of Greedy (Algorithm 1). Note that maximizing the
score of the target candidate is a NP -hard problem: Consider the case in which there
are only two candidates, α(1) = α(2) = 1, all nodes have c? as second preference,
and the scoring function is that of the plurality rule; maximizing the score is equal
to maximizing the number of active nodes in LTM because when a node becomes
active the target candidate shifts of at least one position up (in this case, in first
position); thus the two problems are equivalent. Since influence maximization in
LTM is NP -hard, then also maximizing the score in LTR is NP -hard because it is
a generalization of LTM. Moreover, in this instance, the maximum value of MoV
is equal to twice the maximum score; then the problem of maximizing MoV is also
NP -hard.
Although maximizing the score is not equivalent to maximizing MoV, in Section 6
we show that it gives a constant factor approximation to MoV. Finally, in Section 7,
we consider the problem of destructive control, in which we want the target candidate
to lose the elections. We prove a constant factor approximation to MoV also in this
case by exploiting a simple reduction that maps it to the constructive case.
4 Maximizing the Score: Plurality Rule
As a warm-up, in this section we focus on the plurality rule. We give an algorithm to
select an initial set of seed nodes to maximize the expected number of nodes that
will change their opinion and have c? as first preference at the end of LTR.
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Given a set of initially active nodes A0, let A be the set of nodes that are active
at the end of the process. An active node v with piv(c?) > 1 will have c? as first
preference if pi↑v(c?) = piv(c?)− 1, that is if and only if
α(piv(c?))
tv
∑
u∈A∩Nv
buv ≥ piv(c?)− 1
or, equivalently,
tv ≤ α(piv(c?))
piv(c?)− 1
∑
u∈A∩Nv
buv.
As for the influence maximization problem, we define an alternative random
process based on live-edge graphs. One possibility could be the following: For each
live-edge graph evaluate which active nodes satisfy the above formula; however, in
the live-edge graph process, we don’t know the value of tv since they are sampled
uniformly at random at the beginning of LTM. To overcome this limitation we
introduce a new process, Live-edge Coin Flip (LCF ).
Definition 1. (Live-edge Coin Flip process)
1. Each node v ∈ V selects at most one of its incoming edges with probability pro-
portional to the weight of that edge, i.e., edge (u, v) is selected with probability
buv, and no edge is selected with probability 1−
∑
u∈Nv buv.
2. Each node v with piv(c?) > 1 that is reachable from A0 in the live-edge graph
flips a biased coin and changes its list according to the outcome. This is
equivalent of picking a random real number sv ∈ [0, 1] and setting the position
of c? according to sv as follows: If sv ≤ α(piv(c?))piv(c?)−1 , node v chooses c? as its first
preference (i.e., it sets p˜iv(c?) = 1 and shifts all the other candidates down by
one position); otherwise, v maintains its original ranking.
In the following we show that the two processes are equivalent, i.e., starting from
any initial set A0 each node in the network has the same probability to end up with c?
in first position in both processes. This allows us to compute the function F (A0), for
a given A0, by solving a reachability problem in graphs, as we will show later in this
section. We first prove the next Lemma which will be used to show the equivalence
between the two processes and to compute F (A0). The lemma shows how to compute
the probability that a node v is reachable from A0 at the end of the LCF process by
using the live-edge graphs or by using the probability of the incoming neighbors of v
to be reachable from A0.
We denote by G the set of all possible live-edge graphs sampled from G. For
every G′ = (V,E′) ∈ G we denote by P (G′) the probability that the live edge graph
is sampled, namely
P
(
G′
)
=
∏
v:(u,v)∈E′
buv
∏
v: 6∃(u,v)∈E′
1− ∑
w:(w,v)∈E
bwv
 .
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We denote by R(A0) the set of nodes reachable from A0 at the end of the LCF
process and by RG′(A0) the set of nodes reachable from A0 in a fixed live-edge graph
G′ and by 1(G′,v) the indicator function that is 1 if v ∈ RG′(A0) and 0 otherwise.
Lemma 1. Given a set of initially active nodes A0, let R(A0) be the set of nodes
reachable from A0 at the end of the LCF process. Then
P (v ∈ R(A0)) =
∑
G′∈G
P
(
G′
) · 1(G′,v) = ∑
U⊆Nv
∑
u∈U
buv ·P ((R(A0) ∩Nv) = U) .
Proof. By the law of total probability
P (v ∈ R(A0)) =
∑
G′∈G
P
(
v ∈ R(A0)
∣∣ G′) ·P (G′) .
Given a live-edge graph G′ sampled form G, the value of P (v ∈ R | G′) is equal to 1
if v is reachable from A0 in G′, and it is 0 otherwise. Then∑
G′∈G
P
(
v ∈ R(A0)
∣∣ G′) ·P (G′) = ∑
G′∈G
P
(
G′
) · 1(G′,v).
which shows the first part of the lemma. We now show the following equality:∑
G′∈G
P
(
G′
) · 1(G′,v) = ∑
U⊆Nv
∑
u∈U
buv ·P ((R(A0) ∩Nv) = U) . (5)
We can re-write the left hand side as∑
G′∈G
P
(
G′
) · 1(G′,v) = ∑
U⊆Nv
∑
G′∈G s.t.
RG′ (A0)∩Nv=U
P
(
G′
) · 1(G′,v).
In each live-edge graph G′ for which P (G′) · 1(G′,v) 6= 0 node v selected one of its
incoming edges and then P (v selected u in LCF ) = buv, for each u ∈ Nv. Therefore,
the above value is equal to∑
U⊆Nv
∑
G′∈G s.t.
RG′ (A0)∩Nv=U
∑
u∈U
P
(
G′
∣∣ v selected u in LCF ) buv
=
∑
U⊆Nv
∑
u∈U
buv
∑
G′∈G s.t.
RG′ (A0)∩Nv=U
P
(
G′
∣∣ v selected u in LCF ) ,
where the first equality is due to the law of total probability and the last one is just
reordering of the terms of the sums.
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In each live-edge G′ that does not contain the edge (u, v), the probability
P (G′ | v selected u in LCF ) is equal to zero. Then,∑
G′∈G s.t.
RG′ (A0)∩Nv=U
P
(
G′
∣∣ v selected u in LCF )
=
∑
G′∈G s.t.
RG′ (A0)∩Nv=U
(u,v)∈E′
P
(
G′
∣∣ v selected u in LCF ) .
By definition of conditional probability we have that the above sum is equal to:∑
G′∈G s.t.
RG′ (A0)∩Nv=U
(u,v)∈E′
P (G′ ∩ (v selected u in LCF ))
buv
.
Since, in each G′ considered in the sum, edge (u, v) belongs to G′, this is equal to:∑
G′∈G s.t.
RG′ (A0)∩Nv=U
(u,v)∈E′
P (G′)
buv
. (6)
Let us now consider the right hand side of Equality (5). For each U ⊆ Nv, the
probability that (R(A0) ∩ Nv) = U is given by the sum of the probabilities of all
the live-edge graphs that satisfy this property, since these graphs represent disjoint
events, we have:
P ((R(A0) ∩Nv) = U) =
∑
G′∈G s.t.
RG′ (A0)∩Nv=U
P
(
G′
)
.
Let us fix a node u ∈ U . For each G′ ∈ G such that (RG′(A0) ∩ Nv) = U , there
exists a live-edge graph G′′ that has the same edges as G′ but has edge (u, v) as
incoming edge of v. Since all the other edges of G′′ are equal to those of G′, then
(RG′′(A0) ∩Nv) = U .
We have that
P
(
G′
)
=

P (G′′)
buv
· buiv if ∃(ui, v) in G′,
P (G′′)
buv
·
1− ∑
ui∈Nv
buiv
 otherwise.
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Therefore,
∑
G′∈G s.t.
RG′ (A0)∩Nv=U
P (G′) =
∑
G′′∈G s.t.
RG′′ (A0)∩Nv=U
(u,v)∈E′
( ∑
ui∈Nv
buiv
P (G′′)
buv
+
(
1−
∑
ui∈Nv
buiv
)
P (G′′)
buv
)
=
∑
G′′∈G s.t.
RG′′ (A0)∩Nv=U
(u,v)∈E′
P (G′′)
buv
.
Equality (5) follows since the above expression is equal to (6).
The next theorem shows the equivalence between LTR and LCF .
Theorem 2. Given a set of initially active nodes A0, let A′LTR and A
′
LCF be the set
of nodes such that p˜iv(c?) = 1 at the end of LTR and LCF , respectively, both starting
from A0. Then, for each v ∈ V , P (v ∈ A′LTR) = P (v ∈ A′LCF ).
Proof. We exclude from the analysis nodes v with piv(c?) = 1 since they keep their
original ranking in both models. Let us start by analyzing the LTR process. Let A
be the set of active nodes at the end of the LTR process that starts from A0. If U is
the maximal subset of active neighbors of v (i.e. U = A∩Nv), then we can write the
probability that v ∈ A′LTR given U , as
P
(
v ∈ A′LTR
∣∣ (A ∩Nv) = U) = P(tv ≤ α(piv(c?))
piv(c?)− 1
∑
u∈U
buv
)
=
α(piv(c?))
piv(c?)− 1
∑
u∈U
buv.
The overall probability that v ∈ A′LTR is
P
(
v ∈ A′LTR
)
=
∑
U⊆Nv
P
(
v ∈ A′LTR
∣∣ (A ∩Nv) = U) ·P (U = (A ∩Nv))
=
α(piv(c?))
piv(c?)− 1
∑
U⊆Nv
∑
u∈U
buv ·P ((A ∩Nv) = U) .
Let us now analyze the LCF process. In order for v to be in A′LCF it must hold
that the coin toss has a positive outcome and that v ∈ R. Thus,
P
(
v ∈ A′LCF
)
=
α(piv(c?))
piv(c?)− 1P (v ∈ R(A0)) . (7)
By Lemma 1, we have
P
(
v ∈ A′LCF
)
=
α(piv(c?))
piv(c?)− 1
∑
U⊆Nv
∑
u∈U
buv ·P ((R(A0) ∩Nv) = U) .
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By Theorem 1, P ((R(A0) ∩Nv) = U) = P ((A ∩Nv) = U), and hence the theorem
follows.
We now exploit Theorem 2 to show how to compute the value of F (A0). For each
positive integer r ≤ m, we denote by V rci the set of nodes that have candidate ci in
position r. In the case of plurality rule, F (A0) is the expected cardinality of A′LTR,
that is
F (A0) = E
[|A′LTR|] = ∑
v∈V
P
(
v ∈ A′LTR
)
.
By Theorem 2 and Equality (7), this is equal to∑
v∈V
P
(
v ∈ A′LCF
)
= F (∅) +
∑
v∈V, piv(c?)>1
α(piv(c?))
piv(c?)− 1P (v ∈ R(A0)) .
By Lemma 1, it follows that
F (A0) = F (∅) +
∑
v∈V,piv(c?)>1
α(piv(c?))
piv(c?)− 1
∑
G′∈G
P
(
G′
) · 1(G′,v).
We can rewrite the above formula as follows:
F (A0)− F (∅) =
m∑
r=2
∑
v:piv(c?)=r
α(r)
r − 1
∑
G′∈G
P
(
G′
) · 1(G′,v)
=
m∑
r=2
α(r)
r − 1
∑
G′∈G
P
(
G′
) ∑
v:piv(c?)=r
1(G′,v)
=
m∑
r=2
α(r)
r − 1
∑
G′∈G
P
(
G′
) · |{v : v ∈ RG′(A0) ∧ piv(c?) = r}|
=
m∑
r=2
α(r)
r − 1
∑
G′∈G
P
(
G′
) |RG′(A0, V rc?)|,
where, for a graph G′ ∈ G and a positive integer r ≤ m, we denoted by RG′(A0, V rc?)
the subset of V rc? of nodes reachable from a set of nodes A0 in G
′, RG′(A0, V rc?) = {v :
v ∈ RG′(A0) ∧ piv(c?) = r}.
It follows that the function F (A0) is a non-negative linear combination of functions
|RG′(A0, V rc?)|. In the next lemma, we show that RG′(A0, V rc?) in G′ is a monotone
submodular3 function of the initial set of nodes A0. This implies that also F (A0) is
monotone and submodular w.r.t. A0 and the same holds for F (A0)−F (∅). Therefore,
we can use Greedy (Algorithm 1) to find a set A0 whose value F (A0)− F (∅) is at
3For a ground set N , a function z : 2N → R is submodular if for any two sets S, T such that
S ⊆ T ⊆ N and for any element e ∈ N \ T it holds that z(S ∪ {e})− z(S) ≥ z(T ∪ {e})− z(T ).
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least 1−1/e times the one of an optimal solution for election control problem [NWF78].
Note that, we can use the same algorithm to approximate F (A0) within the same
approximation bound.
Lemma 2. Given a graph G′ ∈ G and a positive integer r ≤ m , the size of
RG′(A0, V
r
c?) in G
′ is a monotone submodular function of the initial set of nodes A0.
Proof. Given A0 ⊆ V , for any v ∈ V \A0, the nodes in V rc? that are reachable from
A0 in G′ are reachable also from A0 ∪ {v}. Therefore,
|RG′(A0 ∪ {v}, V rc?)| ≥ |RG′(A0, V rc?)|.
Let us consider two sets of nodes S, T such that S ⊆ T ⊆ V and a node v ∈ V \T .
We show that |RG′(S∪{v}, V rc?)|− |RG′(S, V rc?)| ≥ |RG′(T ∪{v}, V rc?)|− |RG′(T, V rc?)|.
Since v ∈ S ∪ {v}, we have that
|RG′(S ∪ {v}, V rc?)| − |RG′(S, V rc?)| = |RG′(S ∪ {v}, V rc?) \RG′(S, V rc?)|.
Moreover, for any two sets of nodes B,C we have that RG′(B∪C, V rc?) = RG′(B, V rc?)∪
RG′(C, V
r
c?). Hence
RG′(S ∪ {v}, V rc?) \RG′(S, V rc?) = [RG′(S, V rc?) ∪RG′({v}, V rc?)] \RG′(S, V rc?)
= RG′({v}, V rc?) \RG′(S, V rc?).
Similarly,
|RG′(T ∪ {v}, V rc?)| − |RG′(T, V rc?)| = |RG′({v}, V rc?) \RG′(T, V rc?)|.
Since S ⊆ T , then RG′(S, V rc?) ⊆ RG′(T, V rc?) and then RG′({v}, V rc?) \RG′(S, V rc?) ⊇
RG′({v}, V rc?) \RG′(T, V rc?), which implies the statement.
5 Maximizing the Score: Scoring Rule
In this section we extend the results of Section 4 to the general case of the scoring
rule, in which a scoring function f assigns a score to each candidate according to
the positions he was ranked in the voters’ lists. The overall approach is similar, but
more general: We first define an alternative random process to LTR and show its
equivalence to LTR; then we use this model to compute F (A0) and show that it is
a monotone submodular function of the initial set of active nodes A0. This latter
result allows us to compute a set A0 that has an approximation guarantee of 1− 1/e
on the maximization of the score of the target candidate.
The alternative random process, called Live-edge Dice Roll (LDR), is defined as
follows.
Definition 2. (Live-edge Dice Roll process)
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1. Each node v ∈ V selects at most one of its incoming edges with probability pro-
portional to the weight of that edge, i.e., edge (u, v) is selected with probability
buv, and no edge is selected with probability 1−
∑
u∈Nv buv.
2. Each node v with piv(c?) > 1 that is reachable from A0 in the live-edge graph
rolls a biased piv(c?)-sided dice and changes its list according to the outcome.
This is equivalent to picking a random real number sv in [0, 1] and setting the
position of c? according to sv as follows:
p˜iv(c?) =

1 if sv ≤ α(piv(c?))piv(c?)−1 ,
` if α(piv(c?))piv(c?)−`+1 < sv ≤
α(piv(c?))
piv(c?)−` ,
for ` = 2, . . . , piv(c?)− 1,
piv(c?) if sv > α(piv(c?)).
If p˜iv(c?) 6= piv(c?), all candidates between p˜iv(c?) and piv(c?) − 1 are shifted
down by one position.
In the next theorem we show that processes LTR and LDR have the same
distribution.
Theorem 3. Given a set of initially active nodes A0 and a node v ∈ V , let p˜iLTRv (c?)
and p˜iLDRv (c?) be the position of node v at the end of LTR and LDR, respectively,
both starting from A0. Then, P
(
p˜iLTRv (c?) = `
)
= P
(
p˜iLDRv (c?) = `
)
, for each ` =
1, . . . , piv(c?).
Proof. Let A be the set of active nodes at the end of the LTR process that starts
from A0. The probability that an active node moves candidate c? to position ` is
given by the following function.
Definition 3. For each r, ` ∈ {1, . . . ,m} we define:
P (r, `) =

α(r)
r−1 if ` = 1,
α(r)
r−` − α(r)r−`+1 if ` = 2, . . . , r − 1,
1− α(r) if ` = r.
In particular, for a node v, the probability that the second step of LDR yields
p˜iv(c?) = `, for ` = 1, . . . , piv(c?), is P(piv(c?), `). Thus,
P
(
p˜iLTRv (c?) = `
)
=
∑
U⊆Nv
P
(
p˜iLTRv (c?) = `
∣∣ (A ∩Nv) = U) ·P ((A ∩Nv) = U) .
If U is is the maximal subset of active neighbors of v (i.e., U = A∩Nv), then we can
write the probability that p˜iLTRv (c?) = ` given U as follows:
P
(
p˜iLTRv (c?) = `
∣∣ (A ∩Nv) = U) = P(tv ≤ α(piv(c?))
piv(c?)− 1
∑
u∈U
buv
)
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if ` = 1;
P
(
p˜iLTRv (c?) = `
∣∣ (A ∩Nv) = U)
= P
(
α(piv(c?))
piv(c?)− `+ 1
∑
u∈U
buv < tv ≤ α(piv(c?))
piv(c?)− `
∑
u∈U
buv
)
if ` = 2, . . . , piv(c?)− 1;
P
(
p˜iLTRv (c?) = `
∣∣ (A ∩Nv) = U) = P(tv > α(piv(c?))∑
u∈U
buv
)
if ` = piv(c?). In other words,
P
(
p˜iLTRv (c?) = `
∣∣ (A ∩Nv) = U) = P(r, `)∑
u∈U
buv.
Therefore,
P
(
p˜iLTRv (c?) = `
)
= P(piv(c?), `)
∑
U⊆Nv
∑
u∈U
buvP ((A ∩Nv) = U) .
In LDR, P
(
p˜iLDRv (c?) = `
)
= P(v ∈ R(A0)) · P(piv(c?), `). By Lemma 1, it
follows that
P
(
p˜iLDRv (c?) = `
)
= P(piv(c?), `)
∑
U⊆Nv
∑
u∈U
buvP ((R(A0) ∩Nv) = U) .
By Theorem 1, P ((R(A0) ∩Nv) = U) = P ((A ∩Nv) = U), which shows the state-
ment.
By definition, the value of F (A0) is
F (A0) = E
[∑
v∈V
f(p˜iv(c?))
]
=
∑
v∈V
piv(c?)∑
`=1
f(`)P (p˜iv(c?) = `) .
In LDR, P
(
p˜iLDRv (c?) = `
)
= P(v ∈ R(A0)) ·P(piv(c?), `), moreover, by Lemma 1,
P(v ∈ R(A0)) =
∑
G′∈G P (G
′)1(G′,v). Then,
F (A0) =
∑
v∈V
piv(c?)∑
`=1
f(`)P(piv(c?), `)
∑
G′∈G
P
(
G′
)
1(G′,v),
which can be rewritten as
F (A0) =
m∑
r=1
r∑
`=1
f(`)P(piv(c?), `)
∑
G′∈G
P
(
G′
) ∑
v:piv(c?)=r
1(G′,v)
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=m∑
r=1
r∑
`=1
f(`)P(piv(c?), `)
∑
G′∈G
P
(
G′
) |{vv ∈ R(G′) ∧ piv(c?) = r}|
=
m∑
r=1
r∑
`=1
f(`)P(piv(c?), `)
∑
G′∈G
P
(
G′
) |RG′(A0, V rc?)|.
Thus, F (A0) is a non-negative linear combination of the monotone submodular func-
tion |RG′(A0, V rc?)| (see Lemma 2), and hence F (A0)−F (∅) is also monotone and sub-
modular. Thus, we can use Greedy (Algorithm 1) to find a (1− 1/e)-approximation
to the problem of maximizing the score of the target candidate [NWF78].
6 Approximating Margin of Victory
We have seen in previous sections that we can map the problem of maximizing the
score of the target candidate to that of influence maximization both in the plurality
(Section 4) and in the scoring rules (Section 5); we also defined two alternative
processes (Definitions 1 and 2) and showed their equivalence to LTR for both rules
(Theorems 2 and 3). By showing that the objective function is monotone and
submodular w.r.t. the initial set of seed nodes (Lemma 2) it follows that Greedy
(Algorithm 1) finds a (1− 1/e)-approximation of the optimum [NWF78].
In the following we show how to achieve a constant factor approximation to the
original problem of maximizing the MoV by only maximizing the score of the target
candidate. Given the equivalence of the processes with LTR, we can formulate our
original objective function as the average MoVG′ computed on a sampled live-edge
graph G′, namely E [MoV(A0)] = E [MoVG′(A0)], where
MoVG′(A0) = µG′(∅)− µG′(A0),
and µG′ is the change in margin on a fixed G′. We formulate the margin on the
live-edge graphs in a way that is akin to that of [WV18b]: We can exploit such
formulation to prove our constant factor approximation with the same proof structure
since also in our case the objective function is monotone and submodular (Lemma 2).
In particular in the simple case of the plurality rule we have that
E [MoVG′(A0)] :=
m∑
r=2
α(r)
r − 1 |RG′(A0, V
r
c?)|
+ min
cz
(
max
ci
|V 1ci | − |V 1cz |+
m∑
r=2
α(r)
r − 1 |RG′(A0, V
r
c? ∩ V 1cz)|
)
,
where: the first term is the number of points gained by the target candidate after
LTR; the second term (the first inside the minimum) is the number of points of
the most voted opponent before LTR; the third is the total number of points that
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the most voted opponent after LTR had before the process; the fourth term is the
number of points that the most voted opponent after LTR lost because of the shifting
of candidate c?.
Similarly, in the general case of arbitrary scoring rules, we have
E [MoVG′(A0)] :=
m∑
r=2
r−1∑
`=1
P(r, `) |RG′(A0, V rc?)| (f(`)− f(r))
+ min
cz
(
max
ci
m∑
r=1
f(r)|V rci | −
m∑
r=1
f(r)|V rcz |
+
m∑
r=2
r−1∑
`=1
r−1∑
h=`
P(r, `) |RG′(A0, V rc? ∩ V hcz)| (f(h)− f(h+ 1))
)
,
where the meaning of the terms is similar to above. This latter formulation is just a
generalization of the plurality case whenever we choose f such that f(1) = 1 and
f(r) = 0, for each r ∈ {2, . . . ,m}. In this way we would have that the gain in score
would be just 1 and that α(r)r−1 = P (r, 1).
In the following we prove that, up to the loss of a constant-factor in the approxi-
mation ratio, it suffices to concentrate only on the score of the target candidate c?
and not on the margin w.r.t. the most voted opponent.
Theorem 4. Greedy (Algorithm 1) is a 13(1− 1/e)-approximation algorithm for
the problem of election control in arbitrary scoring rule voting systems.
Proof. Let A0 be the solution found by Greedy (Algorithm 1) in the election control
problem and let A?0 be the optimal solution. Let c¯ and cˆ respectively be the candidates
that minimize the second term of E [MoVG′(A0)] and E [MoVG′(A?0)]. Note that
E [MoVG′(A0)] = F (A0)− F (∅) + |V 1c | − |V 1c¯ |
+
m∑
r=2
r−1∑
`=1
r−1∑
h=`
P(r, `) |RG′(A0, V rc? ∩ V hc¯ )| (f(h)− f(h+ 1)),
where c is the most voted candidate before the process. Since F (A0) − F (∅) =∑m
r=2
∑r−1
`=1 P(r, `) |RG′(A0, V rc?)| (f(`)−f(r)) and F (A0)−F (∅) ≥ (1−1/e)(F (A?0)−
F (∅)), we get
E [MoVG′(A0)] ≥ F (A0)− F (∅) + |V 1c | − |V 1c¯ |
≥ (1− 1/e)
[
m∑
r=2
r−1∑
`=1
P(r, `) |RG′(A?0, V rc?)| (f(`)− f(r))
]
+ |V 1c | − |V 1c¯ |
≥ 1
3
(1− 1/e)
[
m∑
r=2
r−1∑
`=1
P(r, `) |RG′(A?0, V rc?)| (f(`)− f(r))
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+m∑
r=2
r−1∑
`=1
r−1∑
h=`
P(r, `) |RG′(A?0, V rc? ∩ V hc¯ )| (f(h)− f(h+ 1))
+
m∑
r=2
r−1∑
`=1
r−1∑
h=`
P(r, `) |RG′(A?0, V rc? ∩ V hcˆ )| (f(h)− f(h+ 1)) + |V 1c | − |V 1c¯ |
]
.
Note that this is possible thanks to Theorem 3 and because the last two terms in
the last inequality are smaller than the first term for any solution A0 and candidate
ci since the solution A0 can only increase the score of c?. Therefore, for any other
candidate ci the score can only decrease. With some additional algebra we get that
E [MoVG′(A0)] ≥ 1
3
(1− 1/e)MoVG′(A∗0) + |V 1cˆ | − |V 1c¯ |
+
m∑
r=2
r−1∑
`=1
r−1∑
h=`
P(r, `) |RG′(A?0, V rc? ∩ V hc¯ )| (f(h)− f(h+ 1)).
By definition of cˆ we have that
|V 1cˆ | − |V 1c¯ | ≥
m∑
r=2
r−1∑
`=1
r−1∑
h=`
P(r, `) |RG′(A?0, V rc? ∩ V hcˆ )| (f(h)− f(h+ 1))
−
m∑
r=2
r−1∑
`=1
r−1∑
h=`
P(r, `) |RG′(A?0, V rc? ∩ V hc¯ )| (f(h)− f(h+ 1))
and therefore
E [MoVG′(A0)] ≥ 1
3
(1− 1/e)MoVG′(A∗0).
7 Destructive Election Control
In this section we focus on the destructive election control problem. The model is
similar to the constructive one (see Section 3): Here we define, for each node v ∈ V ,
the number of positions of which c? shifts down after the LTR process as
pi↓v(c?) := min
m− piv(c?),
α(piv(c?))
tv
∑
u∈A, (u,v)∈E
buv
 .
The final position of c? in v will be p˜iv(c?) := piv(c?) + pi
↓
v(c?) and the overall score
that c? gets is
FD(A0) := E
[∑
v∈V
f(piv(c?) + pi
↓
v(c?))
]
.
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Formally, the problem can be defined as that of finding an initial set of seed nodes
A0 such that
maxA0 E [MoVD(A0)] := E [µ(A0)− µ(∅)]
s.t. |A0| ≤ B,
namely to find an initial set of seed nodes of at most size B that maximizes the
expected MoVD, i.e., minimizes the expected MoV.
Similarly to the constructive case, we aim at decreasing the overall score of a target
candidate c? as much as possible since, as before, in this way we can achieve a constant
factor approximation. To do that we provide a reduction from the destructive to
the constructive case. Given an instance of destructive control, we build an instance
of constructive control in which we simply reverse the rankings of each node and
complement the scoring function to its maximum value. Roughly speaking, this
reduction maintains invariant the absolute value of the change in margin of the
score of any candidate between the two cases. Formally, for each v ∈ V , the new
instance has a preference list defined as pi′v(c) := m− piv(c) + 1 for each candidate
c ∈ C, and, for each position r ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, has a scoring function defined as
f ′(r) := fmax − f(m− r + 1), where fmax := maxr∈{1,...,m} f(r). For each v ∈ V , the
ranking of c? in the new instance is pi′v(c?) := m− piv(c?) + 1.
For each solution A0 found in the new instance, i.e., a constructive one, the overall
score of c? after the process is
F ′(A0) := E
[∑
v∈V
f ′(pi′v(c?)− pi′↑v (c?))
]
,
where pi′↑v (c?) := min
(
pi′v(c?)− 1,
⌊
α(piv(c?))
tv
∑
u∈A, (u,v)∈E buv
⌋)
. Let FD(∅) = F (∅)
and F ′(∅) := ∑v∈V f ′(pi′v(c?)). Then the following lemma holds.
Lemma 3. FD(∅)− FD(A0) = F ′(A0)− F ′(∅), for every A0.
Proof. Observe that pi′↑v (c?) = pi
↓
v(c?) and that piv(c?) = m− pi′v(c?) + 1. It follows
that
F ′(A0)− F ′(∅) = E
[∑
v∈V
[fmax − f(m− (pi′v(c?)− pi′↑v (c?)) + 1)]
]
−E
[∑
v∈V
[fmax − f(m− pi′v(c?) + 1)]
]
= E
[∑
v∈V
[f(m− pi′v(c?) + 1)− f(m− (pi′v(c?)− pi′↑v (c?)) + 1)]
]
= E
[∑
v∈V
[f(m− pi′v(c?) + 1)− f(m− pi′v(c?) + 1 + pi′↑v (c?))]
]
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= E
[∑
v∈V
[f(piv(c?))− f(piv(c?) + pi↓v(c?))]
]
= F (∅)− FD(A0).
The reduction, together with Lemma 3, allows us to maximize the score of the
target candidate in the constructive case and then to map it back to destructive case.
Theorem 5. Greedy (Algorithm 1) is a 12(1− 1/e)-approximation algorithm for
the problem of destructive election control in arbitrary scoring rule voting systems.
Proof. Let A0 be the solution found by Greedy (Algorithm 1) in the election control
problem and let A?0 be the optimal solution. Let c¯ and cˆ respectively be the candidates
that minimize the first term of E [MoVD(A0)] and E [MoVD(A?0)]. By Lemma 3 we
have that
E [MoVD(A0)] = E [µ(A0)− µ(∅)]
= F (∅)− FD(A0)− |V 1c |+ |V 1c¯ |
+
m−1∑
r=1
m∑
h=r+1
m∑
`=r+1
P(r, `) |RG′(A0, V rc? ∩ V hc¯ )| (f(h− 1)− f(h))
= F ′(A0)− F ′(∅)− |V 1c |+ |V 1c¯ |
+
m−1∑
r=1
m∑
h=r+1
m∑
`=r+1
P(r, `) |RG′(A0, V rc? ∩ V hc¯ )| (f(h− 1)− f(h))
where c is the most voted candidate before the process. Since F ′(A0)− F ′(∅) is an
instance of the score in the constructive case we able to approximate this value, thus
we get
E [MoVD(A0)] ≥
(
1− 1
e
)[
F ′(A∗0)− F ′(∅)− |V 1c |+ |V 1c¯ |
+
m−1∑
r=1
m∑
h=r+1
m∑
`=r+1
P(r, `) |RG′(A0, V rc? ∩ V hc¯ )| (f(h− 1)− f(h))
]
≥ 1
2
(
1− 1
e
)[
F (∅)− FD(A?0)− |V 1c |+ |V 1c¯ |
+
m−1∑
r=1
m∑
h=r+1
m∑
`=r+1
P(r, `) |RG′(A?0, V rc? ∩ V hcˆ )| (f(h− 1)− f(h))
+
m−1∑
r=1
m∑
h=r+1
m∑
`=r+1
P(r, `) |RG′(A0, V rc? ∩ V hc¯ )| (f(h− 1)− f(h)) + |V 1cˆ | − |V 1cˆ |
]
≥ 1
2
(
1− 1
e
)[
MoVD(A?) + |V 1c¯ |
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+m−1∑
r=1
m∑
h=r+1
m∑
`=r+1
P(r, `) |RG′(A,0V rc? ∩ V hc¯ )| (f(h− 1)− f(h))− |V 1cˆ |
]
By definition of c¯ we have that
|V 1c¯ | − |V 1cˆ | ≥
m−1∑
r=1
m∑
h=r+1
m∑
`=r+1
P(r, `) |RG′(A0, V rc? ∩ V hcˆ )| (f(h− 1)− f(h))
−
m−1∑
r=1
m∑
h=r+1
m∑
`=r+1
P(r, `) |RG′(A0, V rc? ∩ V hc¯ )| (f(h− 1)− f(h))
and therefore
MoVD(A0) ≥ 1
2
(
1− 1
e
)
MoVD(A∗0).
8 Simulations
In this section we present some experimental results that show how our approximation
algorithm performs on real-world networks. We chose four heterogeneous social and
communication networks on which political campaigning messages could spread,
namely:
1. facebook,4 an undirected network of 10 Facebook users, with 2,888 nodes and
2,981 edges;
2. irvine,4 a directed network of instant messages exchanged between students at
U.C. Irvine, with 1,899 nodes and 20,296 edges;
3. netscience,5 an undirected network of research collaborations in network science,
with 1,461 nodes and 2,742 edges;
4. polblogs,5 a directed network of hyperlinks between web blogs on US politics,
with 1,224 nodes and 19,025 edges.
We made the two undirected networks directed, by doubling the edges and orienting
them; moreover, to adhere to the Linear Threshold Model, we assigned random
weights to edges of the graphs since they are unweighted. Recent literature in
influence maximization shows that advanced techniques can be used to scale our
approximation algorithm to much larger networks [TXS14].
We considered three different scenarios, each with a different number of candidates,
i.e., m = 2, 5, 10. For each scenario, we assigned a random preference list to each
4http://konect.uni-koblenz.de
5http://www.umich.edu/~mejn/netdata/
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node of the networks; this assignment was performed 10 distinct times, by randomly
permuting its preference list. We separately analyzed three different initial budgets,
i.e., B = 5, 10, 15, and three different values of α (the rate at which the position of
candidate c? changes in the preference list of each node), i.e., α = 0.1, 0.5, 1. For each
combination of parameters (dataset, number of candidates, preference list assignment,
budget, and α) we performed 20 experiments for each of the two considered voting
systems, namely plurality rule and borda count (as example for the scoring rule), in
the constructive election control scenario. We measured the Probability of Victory
(PoV), i.e., the fraction of times c? won out of the 20 experiments, and the Margin
of Victory (MoV), average value of the difference between the score of candidate c?
and the score of the most voted opponent.6
All the experiments were run in parallel on a machine with four 16-core AMD
OpteronTM 6376 with 2.3 GHz CPU, 16 MB L2 cache, 64 GB RAM, running Ubuntu
16.04.5 LTS. Overall, we performed 43,200 distinct runs for an average running time
of approximately 15 minutes per run.
Figure 1 shows the effectiveness of the algorithm in the scenario with m = 10
candidates running for the elections and a fixed budget B = 5, 10, 15 using as voting
system the plurality rule and borda count.
We study the impact of α on the behavior of our algorithm (Figure 1). The
algorithm succeeds for α = 0.5, 1.0, making candidate c? win all or most of the
times on all datasets but netscience: We believe this is due to the topology of the
dataset, with 267 connected components, that limitates the influence diffusion process.
Instead, when α = 0.1 it is difficult for the initially targeted voters to influence their
friends in all datasets but facebook, where most of the nodes have few friends and
can be easily influenced by the 10 users on which the network is centered. In fact the
lower is the value of α the higher is the rate at which c? shifts in the preference lists
of the voters.
Tables 1, 2, and 3 report detailed results of the experiments. Table 1 reports
unified results for plurality rule and borda count voting systems, given their equivalence
in the scenario with only m = 2 candidates running for the elections. Figure 1 gives a
visual interpretation of the results, considering the scenario with m = 10, which is the
“hardest” among the considered ones, since it has the maximum number of candidates
and the minimum budget. Each boxplot considers 200 observations, i.e., the results
obtained by permuting the preference list of each voter 10 times and repeating 20
experiments on each of them, and shows the results for all considered values of B.
6Note that in this section we consider MoV = −µ(A0), i.e., we do not consider the initial
difference µ(∅), allowing negative values (we are not computing approximation ratios).
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Figure 1: PoV and MoV with m = 10. Each plot compares the results on different
datasets (facebook, irvine, netscience, polblogs) and for different values of α. For each
dataset, from left to right: α = 0.1 (red), α = 0.5 (green), α = 1.0 (blue).
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Table 1: PoV and MoV values relative to the experiments with m = 2.
PoV MoV
B = 5 B = 10 B = 15 B = 5 B = 10 B = 15
α µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ
f
a
c
e
b
o
o
k 0.1 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 149.78 46.10 165.63 47.32 168.22 46.14
0.5 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 631.90 39.11 743.61 35.70 751.42 38.55
1.0 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1234.91 31.05 1472.39 28.42 1476.18 28.37
i
r
v
i
n
e
0.1 0.95 0.15 0.96 0.13 0.99 0.03 66.93 39.44 82.04 40.21 89.84 38.75
0.5 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 230.48 36.68 313.38 23.76 350.47 19.72
1.0 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 441.67 40.74 624.90 39.16 693.16 59.91
n
e
t
s
c
i
e
n
c
e 0.1 0.74 0.42 0.78 0.39 0.81 0.36 29.95 40.73 32.55 40.80 34.71 40.86
0.5 0.99 0.04 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 55.38 39.76 71.31 40.03 86.40 40.77
1.0 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 85.98 39.57 122.36 40.12 151.88 41.31
p
o
l
b
l
o
g
s 0.1 0.91 0.29 0.92 0.25 0.93 0.22 47.16 30.39 52.69 30.57 55.24 30.40
0.5 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 150.11 29.34 178.11 28.84 196.28 27.95
1.0 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 280.13 27.29 344.81 23.40 387.12 17.19
µ and σ are, respectively, the mean and the standard deviation of the observations averaged over the 10 preference list permutations.
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Table 2: PoV and MoV values relative to the experiments with m = 5.
PoV MoV
B = 5 B = 10 B = 15 B = 5 B = 10 B = 15
α µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ
f
a
c
e
b
o
o
k
P
l
u
r
a
l
i
t
y 0.1 0.86 0.29 0.95 0.12 0.95 0.10 47.52 30.88 55.56 29.91 57.08 29.96
0.5 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 302.92 30.50 362.70 28.65 366.13 28.50
1.0 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 621.27 29.22 745.84 30.36 749.99 28.11
B
o
r
d
a
0.1 0.80 0.42 0.80 0.42 0.80 0.42 80.93 114.03 96.43 114.99 99.04 114.68
0.5 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 629.83 109.08 751.63 106.74 757.55 106.06
1.0 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1314.98 103.33 1572.05 98.62 1588.18 99.25
i
r
v
i
n
e
P
l
u
r
a
l
i
t
y 0.1 0.68 0.40 0.77 0.36 0.81 0.34 10.96 22.64 18.46 22.42 22.53 22.34
0.5 0.99 0.03 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 98.33 22.87 143.74 16.19 171.63 15.92
1.0 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 211.20 25.12 296.33 25.73 341.69 31.26
B
o
r
d
a
0.1 0.61 0.41 0.71 0.41 0.74 0.41 15.32 76.67 29.68 74.70 37.03 75.88
0.5 0.96 0.12 1.00 0.01 1.00 0.00 203.44 74.23 307.97 70.30 359.88 64.62
1.0 1.00 0.01 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 443.95 77.76 624.60 76.87 716.32 81.49
n
e
t
s
c
i
e
n
c
e
P
l
u
r
a
l
i
t
y 0.1 0.32 0.47 0.35 0.47 0.38 0.46 -7.98 22.00 -6.65 21.73 -5.54 21.76
0.5 0.64 0.42 0.82 0.32 0.88 0.31 4.14 21.87 13.25 21.39 20.42 21.12
1.0 0.87 0.31 0.92 0.24 0.96 0.13 19.21 21.01 38.58 20.78 53.11 22.03
B
o
r
d
a
0.1 0.40 0.46 0.44 0.46 0.47 0.46 -21.14 74.37 -18.69 74.14 -16.79 74.47
0.5 0.63 0.48 0.69 0.46 0.74 0.43 4.71 73.90 20.49 73.70 34.58 73.56
1.0 0.74 0.42 0.85 0.33 0.90 0.29 36.54 74.51 73.44 73.24 101.91 73.86
p
o
l
b
l
o
g
s
P
l
u
r
a
l
i
t
y 0.1 0.50 0.44 0.56 0.44 0.60 0.42 3.46 21.11 6.45 20.71 7.58 20.87
0.5 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 56.12 20.49 74.57 18.99 82.99 18.32
1.0 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 125.56 19.15 159.31 16.60 180.31 19.28
B
o
r
d
a
0.1 0.54 0.46 0.62 0.44 0.65 0.45 10.63 63.13 15.99 62.35 19.55 61.99
0.5 0.98 0.04 1.00 0.01 1.00 0.00 126.71 58.98 163.79 62.94 180.19 59.44
1.0 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 271.19 62.85 339.74 59.25 375.73 55.27
µ and σ are, respectively, the mean and the standard deviation of the observations averaged over the 10 preference list permutations.
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Table 3: PoV and MoV values relative to the experiments with m = 10.
PoV MoV
B = 5 B = 10 B = 15 B = 5 B = 10 B = 15
α µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ
f
a
c
e
b
o
o
k
P
l
u
r
a
l
i
t
y 0.1 0.96 0.12 0.97 0.08 0.97 0.08 27.99 14.88 31.81 15.55 32.16 15.50
0.5 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 183.94 12.90 217.54 13.77 220.02 15.09
1.0 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 378.91 13.12 450.20 15.08 454.48 14.53
B
o
r
d
a
0.1 0.80 0.39 0.84 0.33 0.84 0.33 111.75 133.60 130.78 134.36 134.20 135.25
0.5 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 816.22 134.28 973.03 128.19 987.42 134.47
1.0 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1701.58 133.16 2036.01 131.07 2055.55 131.70
i
r
v
i
n
e
P
l
u
r
a
l
i
t
y 0.1 0.40 0.38 0.55 0.34 0.62 0.31 -1.04 11.82 4.09 12.00 6.14 12.05
0.5 0.98 0.04 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 51.49 12.23 79.38 11.78 91.22 15.15
1.0 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 118.46 9.50 175.53 18.33 203.05 19.76
B
o
r
d
a
0.1 0.36 0.45 0.42 0.43 0.46 0.42 -25.12 101.84 -4.95 99.47 3.34 99.69
0.5 0.93 0.13 1.00 0.01 1.00 0.00 216.60 100.45 347.52 98.22 408.77 107.29
1.0 0.99 0.02 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 508.13 114.34 780.43 102.47 885.19 125.87
n
e
t
s
c
i
e
n
c
e
P
l
u
r
a
l
i
t
y 0.1 0.18 0.36 0.23 0.39 0.24 0.41 -13.66 12.85 -12.97 12.84 -12.41 12.90
0.5 0.31 0.48 0.39 0.45 0.53 0.41 -6.05 13.20 -0.57 13.21 3.75 13.24
1.0 0.51 0.41 0.86 0.27 0.97 0.09 3.17 13.69 15.00 13.33 25.42 13.36
B
o
r
d
a
0.1 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.32 0.14 0.32 -108.47 81.50 -105.35 81.60 -102.35 81.83
0.5 0.20 0.41 0.25 0.41 0.32 0.42 -75.12 81.05 -53.48 80.35 -36.07 81.25
1.0 0.33 0.41 0.54 0.46 0.66 0.42 -32.80 79.95 14.51 83.71 48.93 84.95
p
o
l
b
l
o
g
s
P
l
u
r
a
l
i
t
y 0.1 0.41 0.46 0.45 0.47 0.48 0.48 -2.22 15.10 -0.83 15.12 0.14 14.97
0.5 0.97 0.06 1.00 0.01 1.00 0.00 31.21 14.73 41.51 14.67 46.43 13.25
1.0 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 73.13 14.60 94.24 11.49 106.88 12.39
B
o
r
d
a
0.1 0.25 0.41 0.27 0.44 0.28 0.45 -48.35 92.53 -42.21 92.46 -38.94 92.17
0.5 0.87 0.18 0.96 0.07 0.99 0.02 103.80 94.58 141.53 93.96 170.65 92.91
1.0 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 293.93 95.50 372.21 100.52 423.54 93.06
µ and σ are, respectively, the mean and the standard deviation of the observations averaged over the 10 preference list permutations.
27
9 Discussion of Results
The results in our paper are very significant. Nowadays social media are are significant
sources of information for voters and the massive usage of these channels for political
campaigning is a turning point. Potential attackers can manipulate the outcome of
elections through the spread of targeted ads and/or fake news. Being able to control
the information spread can have a great impact, but it is not easy to achieve given
that traditional media sources are relatively transparent. Therefore, it is essential
to protect the integrity of electoral processes to ensure the proper operation of
democratic institutions. Our results indicate that social influence is a salient threat
to election integrity: We provide an approximation algorithm to maximize the MoV
of a target candidate, that can be used by an attacker to control the election results
and is of fundamental importance to protect their fairness.
There is only another paper that focus on the problem of election control through
social influence [WV18b]. Compared to it, we consider a more realistic model (LTM
instead of ICM) that takes into account the amount of influence that voters exercise
on each other. We believe that our algorithm could be used in real-life scenarios to
predict election results and to understand what degree of control has been exercised.
Our results assume the knowledge of election data that are not available (degrees
of influences and preferences of voters), but that can be estimated. Even if such
estimation is not easy, experimental results show that greedy has good performances
even on real-world datasets where this data are uncertain. With this respect, we
are aware of recent studies that analyze the robustness of greedy w.r.t. inaccurate
estimations of the degrees of influence; again, ground truth for such quantities is not
available and good estimates are hard to get. Nevertheless, experimental results on
greedy algorithm for Influence Maximization showed that the worst case hardness
theoretical results do not necessarily translate into bad performance on real-world
datasets [HK18].
10 Conclusion and Future Work
Online social networks are increasingly utilized for political campaigning since specific
users can be targeted by advertisement and/or fake news. We focused on the problem
of controlling election through social influence: Given a social network of people
willing to vote, we aim at selecting a fixed-size subset of voters such that their
influence on the others will change the outcome of the elections, making some specific
candidate win or lose.
We described a powerful extension of the Linear Threshold Model, which describes
the change of opinions taking into account the amount of exercised influence. We
provided a constant factor approximation algorithm to the problems of constructive
and destructive election control, considering arbitrary scoring rule voting systems,
including plurality and borda count. Greedy (Algorithm 1) achieves a 13(1− 1/e)
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approximation ratio in the constructive scenario, since we showed that any scoring
function is monotone submodular w.r.t. the initial set of active nodes. Similarly, we
get a 12(1− 1/e) approximation ratio for the destructive scenario.
We performed a simulation of our algorithm in our model, examining it on real-
world networks using synthetic election data, i.e., random degrees of influences of
voters on each other and random preference lists for each voter. We ran the simulation
with different combinations of parameters, varying B, α, |C|, and piv for each v ∈ V
on 4 networks exhibiting heterogeneous topologies, namely facebook, polblogs, irvine,
netscience. We observed that Greedy is able to find a solution that makes the target
candidate win the election in the plurality rule with 10 candidates between 50% and
88% of the times, depending on the value of α that changes the degree of influence,
using only 5 seed nodes.
As future research directions we would like to further study our model in a
wider range of scenarios which are not currently captured, including multi-winner
and proportional representation systems. We also believe that approaches that mix
constructive and destructive control could be analyzed to get better approximation
ratios. Moreover, we would like to extend our model in order to consider a more
uncertain scenario, in which the preferences of voters are not known. Finally, it would
be interesting to study how to prevent election control for the integrity of voting
processes, e.g., through the placement of monitors in the network [ZATN15, AAAF17]
or by considering strategic settings [YVAH18, WV18a].
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